**ENDORSED** FILED San Francisco County Superior Court

> MAR 3 2003

GORDON PARK-LI, Clerk BY: IRIS L. HAMMER Deputy Clerk

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I. INTRODUCTION

NORTHWEST ENERGETIC SERVICES,

Plaintiff,

Defendant.

LLC, a Washington Limited Liability

CALIFORNIA FRANCHISE TAX

BOARD, an Agency of the State of

The sole issue in this case is whether California's levy on limited liability companies ("LLCs"), codified as Cal. Rev. & Tax. Code § 17942 (hereinafter the "Levy" or "Section 17942"), violates the Commerce Clause of the United States Constitution or the Due Process Clauses of the United States Constitution. The Court finds that the Levy indeed violates both the Commerce and Due Process Clauses. Accordingly, it cannot be applied to Plaintiff Northwest Energetic

SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

COUNTY OF SAN FRANCISCO

No.

**DECISION** 

Department: 602

CGC-05-437721

PROPOSED STATEMENT OF

Judge: Hon. Donald Mitchell

Hearing Date: January 23, 2006

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All section references are to the Revenue and Taxation Code unless otherwise noted.

Services, LLC ("Plaintiff" or "NES"), and Plaintiff is entitled to a full refund of all amounts it paid (including interest and penalties) pursuant to Section 17942 for the calendar years 1997 and 1999 through 2001 (the "Years at Issue"), plus refund interest as provided by law.

#### II. FINDINGS OF FACT

The facts in this case are not in dispute and a stipulation of those facts is attached and incorporated herein.

#### A. Procedural Background

On June 24, 1997, pursuant to Corporations Code § 17451, Plaintiff registered as an LLC with the Secretary of State and remained registered until June 13, 2002. (Joint Stipulation ("JS") ¶ 9.) Plaintiff filed tax returns with the FTB for each of the Years at Issue and paid the \$800 minimum tax imposed on LLCs under Rev. & Tax. Code § 17941. (JS ¶ 11.) At the time it filed those returns, Plaintiff did not pay any amounts pursuant to Rev. & Tax. Code § 17942. (JS ¶ 11.)

After notification by the FTB of an alleged balance due, Plaintiff paid \$27,458.13 pursuant to Rev. & Tax. Code § 17942 for the Years at Issue (including late payment penalties and interest), and canceled its registration with the California Secretary of State. (JS ¶ 12.) On February 21, 2003, Plaintiff timely filed a claim for refund of the foregoing amount, and thereafter exhausted administrative remedies with respect to the claim. (JS ¶¶ 13-17.)

#### B. Plaintiff's Business

During the Years at Issue, NES was an LLC organized under the laws of the State of Washington. (JS  $\P$  4.) Plaintiff distributed explosives and explosives-related services to customers located solely outside California. Plaintiff's only business locations were in Washington and Oregon. (JS  $\P$  5.)

Plaintiff conducted no business activities in California, either transitory or permanent. (JS ¶¶ 6 and 7.) It had no operations, property, inventory, or place of business in California. (Id.) Plaintiff had no employees, agents, or independent contractors acting on its behalf in California. (JS ¶ 6.) It made no deliveries to customers in California at any time, nor did it solicit any customers in California because California was not a part of its distribution territory. (JS ¶¶ 4, 6.) Plaintiff's only connection with California during the Years in Issue was that it was registered with the Secretary of State pursuant to Corporations Code § 17451. (JS ¶ 9.)

## C. The Levy

## 1. Application and Computation of the Levy

Section 17942(a) provides that the Levy is applicable to "every limited liability company subject to tax under Section 17941." Under Section 17941, LLCs are subject to tax and, therefore, to the Levy if either (a) they are "doing business" in California, or (b) even if they are not doing business in California, their articles of organization have been accepted by the California Secretary of State or they have received a certificate of registration from the California Secretary of State.

Pursuant to Section 17942(a), an LLC's liability for the Levy is computed on the basis of its "total income from all sources reportable in this state for the taxable year." The parties agree, and this Court finds, that "total income from all sources reportable in this state for the taxable year" means the LLC's "total income," without apportionment. Whereas apportionment would remove from the taxable base income earned outside California's borders, the Levy applies to an

Section 17942(b)(1) defines "total income" as "gross income as defined in Section 24271, plus the cost of goods sold that are paid or incurred in connection with the trade or business of the taxpayer." This amount is also commonly referred to as a taxpayer's "gross receipts."

LLC's entire income, wherever earned. Due to this absence of any apportionment mechanism for the Levy, any LLC earning the same amount of total income as Plaintiff earned annually would pay the same Levy as Plaintiff, even if it conducted all of its activity in California.

### 2. Purpose of the Levy and Use of Its Proceeds

The Levy was enacted in 1994 as part of the California Limited Liability Company Act (Senate Bill 469) ("LLC Act"), which authorized LLCs for the first time to organize and register in the State. Because corporations are subject to a franchise tax (based on income) but LLCs are not,<sup>3</sup> the Legislature predicted an increasing number of businesses would operate as LLCs rather than as corporations, resulting in a decrease in income tax revenues.<sup>4</sup> Thus, to offset this loss in tax revenue, the Legislature added to the LLC Act two revenue raising provisions: Section 17942 (which imposed the Levy) and Section 17941 (which imposed an \$800 minimum tax).<sup>5</sup> The law set the Levy for the first few years at graduated amounts that depended upon the range into which the LLC's total income fell.<sup>6</sup> The law also directed the FTB to analyze annually, beginning in 1999, the revenue impact of the LLC Act, and empowered the FTB to adjust

Unless it elects otherwise, an LLC is not subject to tax by California on its net income. Instead, like a partnership, an LLC is treated as a pass-through entity, and its owner(s) are taxed on the LLC's income. In contrast, both corporations and their shareholders are subject to net income tax.

See FTB Bill Analysis for SB 930 (as introduced), dated August 11, 1993, Vol. 6 Joint Exh. 39, JointExh: 1960.

Senate Revenue and Taxation Committee Revised Bill Analysis for SB 469, Vol. 2 Joint Exh. 18, JointExh: 259; Letter from Sen. R. Beverly to Gov. Wilson, dated August 31, 1994, Vol. 3 Joint Exh. 19, JointExh: 535 (stating that "[t]he tax provisions have been carefully crafted to ensure the measure is revenue neutral" by imposing an \$800 minimum tax and the Levy).

See Stat. 1994, Ch. 1200, § 67 (enacting Cal. Rev. & Tax. Code § 23092), Vol. 1 Joint Exh. 9, JointExh: 0264.

the amount of the Levy so that the revenue generated by the Levy and the minimum tax equaled the amount of lost corporate income tax revenues. Based on the record, the Court finds the Levy was designed to replace lost income tax revenue and, therefore, the purpose of the Levy was to raise revenue. This conclusion is bolstered by evidence in the record that all proceeds from the Levy were and are deposited in the State's general fund. (JS ¶ 18.)

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JointExh: 0265.

The Court finds no support for the notion that the purpose of the Levy was to reimburse the State for costs associated with regulating or providing services to LLCs. First, the Legislature specifically provided for appropriations to reimburse the two State agencies (namely, the FTB<sup>8</sup> and the Secretary of State<sup>9</sup>) that would incur costs to implement the LLC Act. 10

Second, to reimburse the one agency that would incur ongoing costs associated with processing LLC filings, the Secretary of State, the Legislature

<sup>15</sup> Id. (enacting Cal. Rev. & Tax. Code § 23093), Vol 1 Joint Exh. 9, 16

See Stat. 1994, Ch. 1200 § 94, Vol. 1 Joint Exh. 9, JointExh: 0276 ("For purposes of implementing and administering this act in the 1994-95 fiscal year, the sum of three hundred fifty thousand dollars (\$350,000) is hereby appropriated from the General Fund to the Franchise Tax Board, in augmentation of Item 1730-001-001 of the Budget Act of 1994. It is the intent of the Legislature that the funds required to administer this act for the 1995-96 fiscal year and each fiscal year thereafter, shall be provided for in the annual Budget Act."), see also Department of Finance Bill Analysis of SB 469 (as amended June 13, 1994), Vol. 3 Joint Exh. 19, JointExh: 0949 (indicating the FTB estimates that it would incur costs of \$250,000 annually beginning in the 1995-1996 year for system maintenance in connection with the LLC Act).

See Stat. 1994, Ch. 1200 § 27, Vol. 1 Joint Exh. 9, JointExh: 0231 (enacting Corp. Code § 17705, which provided for an appropriation of \$234,000 "to the Secretary of State from the Secretary of State's Business Fees Fund for expenditure in the 1994-95 fiscal year, to be expended on the initial program costs and to initiate the development of an automated system to support the program").

Department of Finance Bill Analysis of SB 469 (as amended January 19, 1994), Vol. 2, Joint Exh. 18, JointExh: 0773 (indicating that the Department of Corporations would not incur any significant costs attributable to the LLC Act that is not recoverable through standard filing fees).

enacted a schedule of filing fees. 11 Such fees are deposited into the Secretary of State's Business Fees Fund. 12

Third, the proceeds generated by the Levy greatly exceed the cost of any possible regulatory purpose the Levy might serve. Indeed, in fiscal years 1997 and 1998, the proceeds of the Levy were more than half of, and in all subsequent years exceeded, the *entire* budget of the Secretary of State. Given the Secretary of State's vast responsibilities, only a small portion of the budget can possibly be attributed to activity related to LLCs. The fact that the proceeds from the Levy were so significant confirms the Levy was not intended to reimburse the State for costs associated with regulating or providing services to LLCs.

#### III. DETERMINATION OF ISSUES

For the reasons set forth below, this Court concludes that the Levy is a tax. The Court further concludes that, as such, the Levy violates the "fair apportionment" requirement of the Commerce and Due Process Clauses<sup>13</sup> of the United States Constitution.

#### A. The Levy is a Tax

The label assigned to a levy is not determinative of whether it is a tax or a fee. See, e.g., Weekes v. City of Oakland, 21 Cal. 3d 386, 392 (1978) ("The character of a tax is ascertained from its incidents, not its label."). Instead, "the government bears the burden of proof" that the true substance of a levy is a fee and not a tax under California law. California Assn. of Prof. Scientists v. Dept.

See Stat. 1994, Ch. 1200 § 27, Vol. 1 Joint Exh. 9, JointExh: 0230-0231 (enacting Corp. Code Sections 17700 through 17704, providing for LLC filing fees).

See Gov. Code § 12176 (stating further, "It is the intent of the legislature that moneys deposited into the Secretary of State's Business Fees Fund shall be used to support the programs from which the fees are collected [and] that the fees shall be sufficient to cover the costs of the programs.")

For all of the same reasons, the Levy violates the Due Process Clause of the California Constitution.

of Fish & Game, 79 Cal. App. 4th 935, 945 (2000). <sup>14</sup> This is true notwithstanding the fact that Plaintiff bears the ultimate burden of proof in this case.

The essence of a tax is that it raises revenue for general governmental purposes and is "compulsory rather than imposed in response to a voluntary decision . . . to seek benefits." Sinclair Paint Co. v. State Bd. of Equaliz., 15 Cal. 4th 866, 874 (1997). A fee, by contrast, must fund a regulatory program or compensate for services provided by, and/or benefits received from, the government. Id. at 874-75 (describing three types of fees—regulatory fees, development fees, and special assessments).

In this case, the Levy is clearly a tax. As noted above, the record in this case confirms the purpose of the Levy is to raise revenue. See discussion at pp. 2-4, supra. Moreover, unlike the revenue from a fee, which must be dedicated to its purpose, e.g., the regulatory scheme it is intended to fund, the Levy is intended for, and used solely for, general governmental purposes. (JS ¶ 18.) See discussion at p. 4, supra. In light of the revenue raising purpose and the deposit of the proceeds into the general fund for general governmental purposes, the Levy is a tax.

Likewise, the Levy is not a fee because it bears no relationship to benefits received or burdens imposed by the payor. <sup>15</sup> Under *United Business Commission* v. City of San Diego, 91 Cal. App. 3d 156, 165 (1979), the amount of a

The FTB contends that the holding of California Assn. of Prof. Scientists is limited to characterization of a levy as a tax or a fee for purposes of California's Proposition 13. The cases cited by the FTB do not support this narrow interpretation. Moreover, assigning the burden of proving a levy is a tax or a fee to the government reflects sensible policy because the government possesses information necessary to make this determination.

In fact, NES received no services nor sought any particular benefits from the State, but rather was subject to the Levy as a result of earning income entirely outside of California.

regulatory license or permit fee "cannot exceed the sum reasonably necessary to cover the costs of the regulatory purpose sought." The FTB identifies the relevant costs as "those incident to the issuance of the license or permit, investigation, inspection, administration, maintenance of a system of supervision and enforcement." But the FTB never attempted to quantify these costs. Indeed, the FTB has introduced no evidence that the Levy is related in any way to regulating LLCs, or that its proceeds fund any regulatory program or otherwise compensate for services provided by, and/or benefits received from, the government. The FTB's unsubstantiated claims that the benefits enjoyed by LLCs are "highly valuable," "immeasurable, and "clearly exceed the minimal amount of the annual LLC fee" do not satisfy the FTB's burden.

The FTB claims the Levy was enacted pursuant to the State's police power, and that it serves a regulatory purpose, by reference to the legislative history of the LLC Act. In particular, the FTB quotes passages from the LLC Act stating that it was necessary for "preservation of the public peace, health, or safety," and identifying certain regulatory functions of the LLC Act. (See Defendant's Opening Trial Brief, at page 5.)<sup>16</sup> However, the FTB failed to establish how the Levy itself (as opposed to the LLC Act as a whole) promotes public peace, health, or safety or otherwise regulates LLCs. <sup>17</sup>

For all of the foregoing reasons, the Court holds that the Levy is a tax.

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The Court notes that the passages quoted by the FTB also states that the LLC Act will "improve California's business climate and tax base." See id. at page 6 (emphasis supplied).

Even if this Court could accept some regulatory purpose for the Levy, for the reasons noted above, the Court must conclude the amount of the Levy is not correlated to the cost of any such regulatory purpose because, as stated above, the record contains no evidence of any costs associated with the purported regulatory activities.

# B. The Levy is Unconstitutional Because It is Not Fairly Apportioned

Having concluded the Levy is a tax, the Court must also conclude the Levy violates the Due Process and Commerce Clauses of the United States

Constitution. A fundamental constitutional principle governing state taxation (grounded in the Due Process and Commerce Clauses) is that a state tax must be fairly apportioned, i.e., it must be calibrated to the level of activity in the State. See Complete Auto Transit, Inc. v. Brady, 430 U.S. 274, 279 (1977) (a levy on interstate commerce must (1) be "applied to an activity with a substantial nexus with the taxing state", (2) be "fairly apportioned"; (3) "not discriminate against interstate commerce" and (4) be "fairly related to the services provided by the state"); Oklahoma Tax Comm'n v. Jefferson Lines, Inc., 514 U.S. 175, 189

(1995) (confirming the continuing applicability of Complete Auto's four-part test); Hans Rees' Sons, Inc. v. North Carolina, 283 U.S. 123, 134 (1931) (a tax will be struck down under the Due Process Clause if it seeks to "reach profits which are in no just sense attributable to transactions within [the taxing] jurisdiction").

The United States Supreme Court has further refined the fair apportionment requirement to require both "internal consistency" and "external consistency." "Internal consistency is preserved when the imposition of a tax identical to the one in question by every other State would add no burden to interstate commerce that intrastate commerce would not also bear." Jefferson Lines, 514 U.S. at 184. "External consistency, on the other hand, looks not to the logical consequences of cloning, but to the economic justification for the State's claim upon the value taxed, to discover whether a State's tax reaches beyond that portion of value that is fairly attributable to economic activity within the taxing State." Id.

The Levy fails both the internal and external consistency requirements of the Constitution's fair apportionment requirement. By the terms of Rev. & Tax. Code § 17942, the amount of the Levy is determined based upon "total income from all sources reportable to this state," i.e., worldwide gross receipts without apportionment. See discussion at p. 3, supra. Applying the internal consistency requirement, if one assumes the Levy were replicated in every state across the country, an interstate LLC with the same total income as Plaintiff would pay the maximum Levy in every jurisdiction in which it operated (or simply registered to do business). By contrast, an LLC operating wholly within a single state would pay the maximum Levy, but only once. Thus, interstate commerce plainly would bear a greater burden than intrastate commerce, and the Levy fails the internal consistency test. Moreover, as demonstrated by Plaintiff's alleged liability for the Levy despite its lack of any activity in California, the Levy undeniably "reaches beyond that portion of value that is fairly attributable to economic activity within the taxing State." Stated differently, it is clear the Levy is not calibrated to Plaintiff's California activity because Plaintiff engaged in none. Therefore, the Levy also fails the external consistency requirement.

The courts have consistently and repeatedly struck down unapportioned taxes as unconstitutional. See, e.g., Central Greyhound Lines, Inc. v. Mealey, 334 U.S. 653 (1948); City of Modesto v. National Med, Inc., 128 Cal. App. 4th 518 (2005); City of Winchester v. American Woodmark Corp., 471 S.E.2d 495 (Va. 1996); S. Pac. Transp. Co. v. Dep't of Revenue, 44 P.3d 1006 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2002).

Simply, because the Levy is unapportioned, it violates the Commerce and Due Process Clauses. As such, the Levy cannot constitutionally be applied to

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IV. ORDER

Plaintiff, Northwest Energetic Services, LLC, is the prevailing party and is entitled to judgment against Defendant, Franchise Tax Board, for a full refund of all amounts it paid (including all interest and penalties) pursuant to Section 17942 for the calendar years 1997 and 1999 through 2001, plus refund interest as provided by law.

Plaintiff, and Plaintiff is entitled to a full refund all of its payments pursuant to

Rev. & Tax. Code § 17942 for the Years at Issue. 18

This Proposed Statement of Decision shall be the Statement of 2 Decision unless, within fifteen days, either party specifies issues or makes proposals not contained herein. The Plaintiff is to prepare a form of judgment consistent with this order and the Statement of Decision.

Dated: March 2, 2006

DONALD S. MITCHELL Judge of the Superior Court

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Even if the Levy were deemed a fee, the Court finds that it would be subject to the fair apportionment requirement of the Commerce and Due Process Clauses of the United States Constitution. See American Trucking Ass'ns v. Scheiner, 483 U.S. 266, 285 (1987) (applying the fair apportionment requirement to strike down an unapportioned fee); American Trucking Ass'ns, Inc. v. Michigan Public Service Comm'n, 125 S. Ct. 2419, 2425 (2005) (citing American Trucking Ass'ns v. Scheiner with approval). The Court rejects any reliance on Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., 397 U.S. 137 (1970) (analyzing under the Commerce Clause a regulation dictating the manner in which cantaloupes grown in Arizona must be packed), because the FTB has cited no authority for extending the case to monetary impositions by the government.

## CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE BY MAIL

2	(Code Civ. Proc. 1013a(4))
3	
4	I, <u>Iris Hammer</u> , a deputy clerk of the Superior Court for the City and County of San Francisco, certify that:
5	1) I am not a party to this action,
7	2) On MAR 3 2006 , I served the attached:
8	
9	PROPOSED STATEMENT OF DECISION
10	
11	by placing a copy thereof in a sealed envelope, addressed as follows:
12	
13	Marguerite C. Stricklin, Esquire Deputy Attorney General Office of the Attorney General Silverstein & Pomerantz, LLP 55 Hawthorne Street, Suite 440
14	1515 Clay Street, 20th Floor San Francisco, CA 94105
15 16	Oakland, CA 94612-0550
17	and,
18	
19	3) I then placed the sealed envelope in the outgoing mail at 400 McAllister
20	Street, San Francisco, CA 94102-4514 on the date indicated above for collection, attachment of
21	required prepaid postage, and mailing on that date following standard court practices.
22	MAR 3 2006
23	DATED: GORDON PARK-LI, Clerk
24	
25	By: Deputy
26	IRIS L. HAWIMER
27	
28	